INTRODUCTION
This study is about nuclear fissile material leakage from the former Soviet Union. The impact of uncontrolled (loose) nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear material is widely regarded as the number one threat to the United States National Security interests. Russia has a tremendous amount of nuclear material and security is bad. Countries wishing to acquire nuclear materials to threaten U.S. interests are many. Once Third World countries have acquired nuclear weapons and fissile material, there is little we can do to 'counter this situation.
This paper provides the details of Russian nuclear weaponsuseable material leakage, and recommends policy options to deal with this critical threat to U.S. forces and other security interests.
Since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union, 4 The press has been filled with accounts of alleged illegal trafficking of nuclear fissile material since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The extent of these press reports has been in the hundreds with most amounting only to hoaxes. Is there a supply and demand side that can account for this flurry of press
•activity? The available facts should cause us grave concern for the following reasons. First of all, since the many attempts to sell nuclear materials, this implies there is a viable market for nuclear materials outside the former Soviet Union. Secondly, the previously mentioned six known incidents indicate a major, effort to fill requisitions for the supply side of a growing Black There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S. "6 This policy is further reinforced by the recent publication of President Clinton's, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," which states Weapons of Mass Destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global security. We must continue to reduce the threat posed by existing arsenals of such weaponry as well as work to stop the proliferation of advanced technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the hands of parties hostile to US and global security interests.
Danger exists from outlaw states opposed to regional and global security efforts and transnational actors, such as terrorists or international crime organizations, potentially employing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against unprotected peoples and governments. 7 The president's policy on countering WMD appears to be succinct and to the point. Let us now analyze this policy using a conceptual framework of ends, ways, and means.
Taking a look at the policy objectives, i. e. , ends, PDD 39 briefly states that "The United States shall give the highest priority to counter WMD use by terrorists." 
US INTERESTS
In all three scenarios, the US is deeply concerned about the human suffering, economic instability, and chaos that would reign in the wake of a nuclear blast. However, the level of US In the case of a nuclear armed Iran, our national interests are moderate to high when one considers the steady flow of oil out of the Gulf and the Force Protection of U.S. ships in the Region. 23 According to Kahan, ''There are essentially four criteria on whether to use our military power to preemptively destroy the Third World Nuclear Force in question:
•The higher the US interests at stake, the stronger the desire to use force to prevent nuclear use.
•The greater the likelihood of imminent nuclear use by an adversary, the more pressure there will be for turning to military solutions .
•The more sophisticated a nuclear opponent, the less likely that US decision makers will consider use of military force.
»The more domestic and international ' political opposition to the use of military force, the greater the chance that decision makers will rule out this option."
24

IMMINENT USE
In situations where tensions are high between belligerents in a region, U.S. intelligence sources are able to view with real time clarity on a consistent basis, the mating of nuclear warheads to missile assemblies. Our National Command Authority then must make a choice between two risky actions.
According to Kahan the two choices are "Launching a preemptive counterforce strike, which may not be successful and could cause both actual and political fallout, or taking no offensive actions, and hoping that the adversary will not launch its missiles or that available missile defenses will intercept any such attacks . " 
RECOMMENDATIONS
What should we do? Most countries of the former Soviet Union recognize that nuclear leakage is a global problem threatening terrible consequences. But they lack the means to prevent it.
Project "Sapphire" showed how the West can make a difference.
The United States has pledged more than $1.5 billion to install modern security systems and to build secure storage facilities for fissionable materials. We can encourage the Laboratory-tolaboratory exchanges and manufacturers of nuclear security devices -microwave barriers, video surveillance, high tech fencing and detectors -to start joint production ventures with former Soviet states. We can tighten export controls in the U.S.
and Europe. And, finally, we can accelerate the deal to buy 500 tons of Russian HEU now for conversion to civilian reactor fuel. Iraqis, the first-day story will be shock, horror. And the second-day story will be, we knew this was going to happen, it 30 was almost inevitable."
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